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Cook: The March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy Ridge

Tim Cook

S

ixty thousand Canadians were killed by shell,
bullet and poison gas, among other horrors
in the Great War from 1915-1918. By the
Armistice, roughly one in every nine Canadians
who served in France had been killed. The terrible
c a r n a g e of the First World War r e m a i n s
associated with the major battles which have
become the pegs by which the conflict is
measured: the 2nd Battle of Ypres in 1915; St.
Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the Somme in 1916; Vimy
Ridge, Hill 70 and Passchendaele in 1917; and
finally, the March offensive and the string of
operations making up the Last 100 Days in 1918.
But between these great conflagrations, which
lasted between three days and three months,
there raged hundreds of tiny engagements. For
instance, of the 62,315 Canadian casualties in
1917, a full one-third of them came from the
wastage associated with the on-going trench
warfare, as opposed to the major delineated
b a t t l e s of Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, a n d
Passchendaele. 1 Of those 20,000 casualties, a
good portion of them were suffered by soldiers
stumbling their way through the trials of trench

warfare until they were blasted out of existence
by shells they could not see or fight back against.
Yet to helplessly cower in their holes and be
bombed day in and day out was both physically
and mentally destructive. As a result, the trench
soldiers and their commanders adapted to their
circumstance and fought back by trench raiding,
an activity which allowed soldiers to strike
against the enemy and thereby ease the
psychological burden of stewing in a trench
waiting for the shell with their name on it. Putting
oneself in harm's way in order to alleviate the
strain of war may seem a strange contradiction,
but such raiding helped the soldier cope with his
absurd predicament.
The writing of Canadian First World War
military history has been largely whiggish in
nature: a success story where Canadian lads,
after a few hard knocks, repeatedly beat back
the Germans at their own game. Charles Stacey,
the doyen of Canadian military history, even
Top: Canadian troops train with gas masks.
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remarked that the creation of the Canadian
Corps was the greatest thing that Canada has
ever done. 2 Heady words, indeed. Accordingly,
the corps' successes have generally been
emphasized over its failures. And inseparable
from t h o s e victories was the positive
contributions of the Canadian generals. In
contrast, British commanders have generally
been condemned for their perceived costly and
sacrificial failures. Incompetence, rigidity, and
a failure to adapt to the new realities of warfare
have led a school of historians to remark that
the British troops were "lions led by donkeys." 3

two exceptional corps commanders, Julian
Byng (May 1916 to J u n e 1917) and Arthur
Currie (June 1917 to the end of the war). 6
Behind the easily identifiable commanders
s t a n d their s u b o r d i n a t e s , the dedicated,
professional staff officers. All C a n a d i a n
generals relied heavily on these trained officers,
who effectively analyzed, coordinated, and
planned operations. And for most of the war,
almost all of the senior staff positions were filled
by very competent British regular officers. The
success of the Canadian Corps in the First
World War in large m e a s u r e s h o u l d be
attributed to this crucial British support. Yet,
it is still w o r t h e x a m i n i n g C a n a d i a n
commanders and policies, rather than simply
declaring them a breed apart from their British
colleagues. Mistakes were made and the history
of the Canadian Corps was not one of sweeping
successes; it was, rather, one of learning from
mistakes and making sure they did not happen
again.7 This article will probe one such incident:
the March 1917 gas raid on Vimy Ridge. This
study will not only illuminate one aspect of the
history of the Canadian Corps, but will also
offer more general observations on the concept
of raiding and the nature of gas warfare.

Left: Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th
Canadian
Division.
Below: Colonel Edmund Ironside, GSO 1, 4th
Canadian Division, with his dog Gibby.

Some Canadian divisional commanders like
Archibald Macdonell, Henry Burstall, L.J.
Lipsett, and Raymond Brutinel 4 were indeed
sharper and better able to understand and
react to the static nature of the fighting than
most of their British counterparts. It should
be remembered, however, that Canadian
commanders were not initially without their
faults, and throughout the war there was a
progressive learning experience. In the process
there were those who did not measure up to
the task of a battlefield command, such as
Richard Turner, commander of the 1st Brigade
and then 2nd Division, who won a Victoria
Cross during the Boer War and whose bravery
was never called into question even when his
competence was. 3 Despite the mixture of
generals, the Canadian Corps was gifted with
8
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T

he Canadian Corps' youngest and final
division, the 4th, arrived in France in
August, 1916. Commanded by David Watson,
a newspaper editor prior to the war, who had
worked his way up from command of the 2nd
Battalion, and then the 5th Brigade, until he
was finally given his division. Holding down the
most important staff officer position (GSO 1)
was Edmund Ironside, the man who was in
charge of planning operations. Imposing at six
foot four inches, he spoke seven languages and
was "supremely self-confident, forceful and
opinionated." 8 Nicknamed "Tiny," he brought
years of experience to the young division for its
first trial by fire. Under Watson and Ironside, the
4th Division acquitted itself well during the
bloody fighting on the Somme in November 1916.
After the first three Canadian divisions were
rotated out of that sector after severe attritional
grinding, the 4th Division captured Regina
T r e n c h . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t the once
formidable Regina Trench, with its bristling
barbed wire barriers, fortified trenches and interlocking machine gun nests, had been blasted out
of existence by the Canadian artillery, the soldiers
of the 4th Division showed that they could fight
alongside their more experienced countrymen,
and with 4,311 casualties, die like Canadians
too.9
Following the fierce fighting on the Somme
the 4th Division joined the Canadian Corps on a
quieter front. Not content to sit back, the
Canadians actively raided the German lines,
causing casualties and eroding the German
morale. Taking pride in winning control of noman's-land, the Canadians began to not only
compete among themselves but with other units
for the biggest bag of prisoners or the most
destruction wrought. 10 The policy of raiding
began to spiral out of control and the 4th Division
was not immune to the informal rivalry. In fact
to distinguish itself, the 4th Division planned the
largest Canadian raid of the war, a 1,600-man
attack behind a poison gas cloud against the
heights of Vimy Ridge. Actually, it was to be more
of a clean up and reconnaissance, for the raiders
were told that the gas would wipe out the enemy
and their role would centre on destroying a few
dugouts and gathering information from the
dead. The result was very different and the
subsequent butchery nearly crippled the 4th
Division as an effective fighting formation
before its major assault on Vimy Ridge.

This article will offer a case study to
understand better the Canadian policy of raiding;
piece together the fragmented narrative of the
raid itself, which has previously been examined
without a proper understanding of the integral
component of poison gas; and attempt to
analyze why the raid was such a failure.
Unrealistic expectations, a break-down in
command, an absence of doctrine, and most
importantly, the inability of staff officers to
understand and adequately employ poison gas,
c u l m i n a t e d in the most self-destructive
Canadian raid of the war. The interplay of
technology and soldiers is a tenuous subject,
but it is the key to understanding the failure
of the Gas Raid of 1 March 1917.

A

fter losing 24,000 casualties in the grisly
fighting on the Somme, the Canadian Corps
under the command of Sir Julian Byng turned
in the winter of 1916-1917 to rebuilding its
shattered battalions and integrating new troops
into the formations. Despite their losses, and
during this period of recuperation, the Canadians
continued to harass the German lines by trench
raids. Long had the Canadians been regarded by
the British as elite soldiers and their refinement
of trench raiding in the last month of 1915 had
led Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the
British Expeditionary Force, to congratulate the
colonials for their skill and elan.11

The Canadians transformed trench raiding
to a deadly art, which wore away at the enemy's
morale and strength as he was kept taut and
nervous whenever opposite the "wild colonials."12
The raids were conducted in the dead of night
and centred on the principle of destroy and
retreat. They were not meant for holding ground
in the enemy trench, simply to wreak havoc. The
chaos of night fighting, false attacks and barrages
up and down the enemy front line, disrupted
communications, and the inherent confusion of
ascertaining where the exact attack was being
launched, left the defenders momentarily
vulnerable. Yet trench raiding was not without
its costs and the intricate plans could degenerate
into mad, vicious battles with high casualties to
both sides. Casualties notwithstanding, the
success of the Canadians in winning control
of no-man's-land, as well as recognition in the
language of the trenches as "fire-eaters,"
9
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further pressed their commanders to organize
larger more innovative assaults.
After a series of daring raids, the 4th
Division planned a larger and riskier operation
t h a n a n y t h i n g c a r r i e d out by its more
experienced corps companions. It was to be
launched against the heights of Vimy Ridge, a
position which dominated Canadian lines and
included the unmarked graves of thousands
of Frenchmen from two previous failed but
more formal a s s a u l t s . As a result of the
particularly s t r o n g position held by the
Germans on top of the ridge, the planners
decided that poison gas would be employed to
suffocate the dug-in garrison. Components of
four battalions would raid the enemy lines. This
policy of raiding was not born in a vacuum,
however, and there was a gradual evolution
culminating in the massive chemical raid.
The solidifying of the Western Front and
the resulting trench warfare had rendered
s o l d i e r s u n a b l e to s t r i k e b a c k at their
tormentors, the enemy artillery. No sweeping
flank attacks or daring bayonet charges were
possible, and the infantryman was forced to
eek out an existence as he held his fortified
ditch against possible enemy attacks. While
statically defending the front, the soldiers made
excellent targets and there was continuous
wastage - eveything from snipers picking off
exposed sentries, stray shells caving in dugouts
or gas discharges burning out men's lungs. The
same was occurring on the other side of noman's-land, and it was this policy of attrition
which Sir Douglas Haig regarded as useful in
grinding down the enemy's forces. The soldiers
were not always happy to comply and the
necessary attrition threatened to dwindle away
in some of the quiet sectors where the infantry
were not willing to "waste" themselves against
the enemy.
In those areas loomed the hard reality, at least
to Haig, of the phrase: "live and let live." Opposing
units, often within a hundred yards of each other,
could choose not to bomb, shoot and otherwise
actively seek out the death of the enemy if he
chose in turn to do the same. It was based on a
series of implied codes which each side worked
out by a system of retribution and reward. For
instance, if one battalion bombed heavily, the
other called down a massive barrage on their
lines; leave us alone, and we'll instruct the
10
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bombardments to fall behind your trenches.
This arrangement of complicated truces was
of course not conducive to winning the war;
one historian has remarked that close to onethird of the British units attempted to set up
this "live and let live" system when they went
into the lines. 13 The main deterrent was an
enemy who refused to follow the rules. The
Canadians were known to do just that, and in
the four months prior to the formal Battle of
Vimy Ridge in April 1917 they launched at least
55 raids. 14 With an already established elite
reputation, the Canadians were generally not
interested in playing games so they might stay
forever in the rat-infested ditches they called
trenches. 15
The most likely victims for the raiders were
the unfortunate sentries who kept watch in the
listening posts in front of the enemy lines. An
unenviable posting at the best of times, the
listeners had to contend with their own fears,
the surreal landscape of no-man's-land at night,
and, most of all, the fact that there were trained
killers lurking amongst the bodies and shellholes
ready to snatch or dispatch them. For Battalion
or Brigade commanders, the aim of the raids was
to hit back at the enemy, keep him apprehensive,
exert control over no-man's-land, gather
information on what units were opposite, look
for any new fortifications or gas canister
emplacements, and of course, kill the enemy.
Higher commands viewed raiding as keeping the
soldiers active and battle-hardened as well as,
among other things, destroying the live and let
live system. There could be no informal truces
where soldiers were actively hunting each other
in no-man's-land; few men would sleep soundly
at the front.

T

he wearing-down process was partly
accomplished through harassment by
poison gas. By 1917, the Canadians had been
subjected to several gas cloud attacks from the
Germans. The most famous and lethal was the
second chlorine gas attack of the war on 24 April
1915 during the 2nd Battle of Ypres. The
Germans had unleashed their new weapon two
days earlier against two French colonial and
territorial divisions to the north of the Canadian
line and had completely routed them, leaving a
mile long gap which the German infantry flowed
into. The raw and untried men of the 1st
4
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Canadian Division shifted over to block the
enemy, all the while launching desperate
counterattacks. The casualties were appalling but
the Canadians held the line as the British rushed
up units piece-meal.
When the Canadians were gassed on the 24th,
some of the more a s t u t e officers, noncommissioned officers and privates, noticing the
green tarnish to their buttons and bayonets from
the earlier gassing, as well as the smell and affect
on their eyes and lungs, had surmised that the
Germans had employed chlorine gas. As the
green-yellow death cloud floated through the
Canadian lines, men passed on hurried advice
to "piss on a rag and stuff it in your mouth if you
want to live."16 The urine reacted with the gas
and generally protected the lungs. Those in the
path of the cloud who covered their mouths with
the foul rags generally survived the gassing; those
that could not or would not, died or were severely
disabled.
The relentless pressure of the German
onslaught pushed the Canadians back, forcing
them to leave many of their wounded and almost
all of their dead to the Germans. The afflicted
men turned green and then black as they
struggled to breath through their destroyed lungs.
In addition to the physical effects, the gas attacks
disrupted communications and induced chaos
in the command structure. To many Canadians
it was simply murder as chemical agents
relentlessly swept across their positions,
suffocating and killing men at random. It is
difficult to put an exact figure on the number of
gas casualties, but in addition to those many who
suffocated outright and were left behind, more
were killed by conventional weapons as gassed
men flopped helplessly about, forsaking cover
and running to the rear. Rendered senseless,
many others were captured. Finally, there was
no consistent attempt to count and accurately
label those gassed men who made it off the
battlefield, only to die in military hospitals. After
three days of grim fighting, the 1st Division had
lost half its fighting strength - more than 6,000
casualties - but in return, it had made a
reputation as an elite fighting force.17
As the Canadians dragged themselves into
reserve, Allied politicians and newspapers
universally labeled the German use of gas as
barbarous. 1 8 Soldiers from the lowest private

to the highest field marshal were vehemently
opposed to the use of chemicals to suffocate
m e n who h a d no c h a n c e of defending
themselves. It was contrary to the rules of war
as set out at the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907, but more importantly, it was counter
to the perceived notion of how war should be
fought. War had been envisioned as a great
game, where the young men of Europe would
come into their own on the battlefield and the
decadence of modern society would be purged.
Such notions, had, of course, already been
blasted out of the soldiers at the front by the
more than one million dead at this point in the
war, but gas was still seen by many as simply
too much. The frantic scramble to devise some
form of protection resulted in a series of gas
masks that initially offered more psychological
than physical protection. All the while, the
advanced state of the German chemical plants
supplied the army with vast stores of chlorine
and later - eight times more lethal - phosgene
gas, in the hope of ending the deadlock of the
t r e n c h e s . When t h e B r i t i s h b e g a n to
manufacture their own gas in mid-1915, the
battlefield was quickly deluged in chemical
agents.
The Canadians were gassed several more
times with chlorine and, after 19 December
1915, phosgene. More debilitating, they began
to fall victim to German gas shells in mid-1916,
as opposed to earlier and less reliable and
accurate gas released from buried canisters.
During the battle of the Somme which raged
from July to November 1916, both sides
employed gas in greater a m o u n t s , more
frequently and to accomplish a variety of
tactical applications. Counter-battery work, the
disruption of the lines of communication and
forming up points, and the harassment of
soldiers and animals were all accomplished by
gas shells. Even with these new roles, there
remained, however, a shortage of gas shells in
the BEF (the Canadian Corps did not receive
their first lethal shells for use until April,
1917)19 and the gas specialists were forced to
continue using canister-released cloud attacks.
Having no special a t t a c k gas p e r s o n n e l
themselves, the Canadians relied on the British
Royal Engineers Gas Specialists to release
chlorine and phosgene from the metal canisters
on their sectors of the front.
The Special Companies were groups of
trained Gas Specialists whose job was to gauge
11
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A gas cloud being released from canisters on the Western Front circa 1916.

the wind, make sure all of the hoses were
emptying gas in the right direction into noman's-land, and then release the gas from the
canisters at the appropriate moment. 20 The
Specialists were generally viewed with distrust
by the infantry who knew that once the gas
was released, they retreated to the rear "before
all hell broke loose."21 One regimental historian
noted that there was always intense retaliation
by the enemy artillery for the release of gas,
and the infantry were less than pleased with
its use on their front; it could also turn back
on them in weak or suddenly reversing wind,
as happened to the British at Loos on 25
S e p t e m b e r 1915. 2 2 Yet the British high
commands continued to view gas, despite the
infantry's apprehension and partly because
they did not understand its limited nature, as
a useful weapon which could be employed in
conjunction with the infantry to achieve
surprise tactical success.
After being plagued by more frequent
German gas attacks, the Canadian Corps
decided to retaliate on 16 January 1917. The
8th Canadian Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division,

proposed to have a gas cloud released in its
sector which would be followed by a smoke
attack and then a series of raiding parties. The
raid was intricately planned and every attempt
at realistic training and the coordination of the
a t t a c k i n g p a r t i e s was o r c h e s t r a t e d . The
C a n a d i a n s had already learned t h a t the
dangers of night raids were numerous, and
soldiers who were simply sent over to wreak
havoc invariably failed with high casualties. It had
to be a planned operation, like a miniature battle.
Men were equipped with trench weapons like
Mills bombs, revolvers and knives; scouts snuck
into no-man's-land to plot hidden routes through
the enemy wire; sentries were warned to expect
men coming in along their front; and the artillery
was instructed to fire box barrages to isolate the
defenders. All of this took time and planning,
especially for the larger raids involving hundreds
of men in company-sized assaults.
The introduction of poison gas to the raid
c a u s e d some c o n c e r n a m o n g front-line
commanders, and complicated the already
delicate planning. Time and time again gas
delivered from buried metal cylinders had

12
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proven to be unstable. At best it involved days
of intense labour in bringing the 150 pound
gas-filled canisters to the front, planting them
beside terrified infantrymen and waiting for a
proper wind; at worst, the canisters could be
p u n c t u r e d by enemy s h r a p n e l or, when
released, unfavourable winds could turn the
gas on the infantry waiting to go over the top.
Despite these drawbacks, gas caused genuine
fear and confusion in the enemy's ranks. 23
For weeks before the raid, the Canadians
organised carrying parties of forty-eight men each
to bring the canisters from the rear on toboggans
and then dragged the final distance overland
during the night to the front-line trenches.24 When
the "rats" (as they were code-named) were
brought into the lines, men of the Royal Engineers
Special Companies set them into specially
prepared "rat traps." They were buried halfway
into the trench floor, sandbags surrounding them
with flexible hoses attached to the nozzles and
running into no-man's-land. They appeared
innocuous, except of course to those men who
had to occupy the trenches, continually praying
that the Germans did not unleash an artillery
strafe that might crack them open. Even if not
burst open, the infantry knew that the use of gas
instigated harsh retaliation.
An uncooperative wind remained a problem.
From 14 January onward, the weather was
moving from east to west, against the Canadian
lines. All soldiers were required to keep their
small box respirators (gas masks) on their
chests, anxiously awaiting any indication that the
Germans might pre-empt their gas strike with
one of their own. The delay was even more intense
for the battle groups, each made up of two officers
and 35 other ranks from the 4th and 5th
Canadian Mounted Rifles, who were to go over
the top following the gas and smoke releases.
The carefully worked out plan called for the
Canadian front line to increase its activity by
firing machine guns, shooting flares and moving
about the trenches to give the impression that
they were nervous and anticipating a raid from
the Germans. This was to be carried out from
sunset to zero hour at 8 pm on 16 January. At
zero hour the infantry were to blaze away with
their machine guns and throw hand bombs into
the gaps in the wire. It was hoped that this would
impress upon the confused Germans that the

Canadians believed they were being raided.
Amidst this confusion and noise, the field artillery
was to lay down a barrage on the enemy trenches
and the heavy artillery to bombard the reserve
areas, thereby, isolating the Germans in the
forward zone who would head into their dugouts
to escape the high explosive barrage. As this was
happening a strong wind was to carry the
simultaneously released poison gas over into the
enemy lines to seep into their trenches. The
artillery would continue moving back and forth
over their position in order to cause more friction
among the defenders and would stop only at 65
minutes past zero. At zero plus 120 minutes a
smoke wave would be put over by the Special
Companies using specially designed smokecandles and the raiders were to follow into the
German lines.25
As the infantry, artillery, special companies
and their commanders waited for a proper wind,
minute after minute ticked away until the zero
hour was missed. The 8th Brigade was scheduled
to be pulled out the next morning and relieved
by the 26th British Infantry Brigade, but clinging
to the hope that the wind would change, the
Canadian raiding parties were left in the line. The
raiders were withdrawn to the reserve trenches
after two days, but they still intended to carry
out the operation. For two weeks the raiding
parties were moved up the line and then back
again as the wind remained temperamental,
constantly changing direction or strength and
leaving all involved thoroughly disgusted. By 4
February the 8th Brigade was moved to a different
sector of the front and the battle groups rejoined
their units, having left the gas canisters to the
British occupying that sector.26
While the raiders were being sent up and
back down the line, on 31 January 1917, the
Germans released a 10 kilometre long gas cloud
of very dense concentration and long duration
against French units between Marquises and
Auberive. Despite the fact that the French had
received warnings of the impending gas attack
and that it was delivered in daylight, they
suffered 1,900 casualties, of which more than
500 died.27 The disquietingly high casualties
and the shocking lack of French anti-gas
discipline was passed on to all Allied armies in
the hope that such a disaster would not happen
again. Not having received a formal report of
the 3rd Division's stillborn raid, and impressed
13
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with the recent German gas results, the 4th
Canadian Division resolved to incorporate gas
into its forthcoming raid against the heights of
Vimy.28
After several months of trench raids gathering
in scope and size, the 4th Division planned to
launch the largest Canadian raid of the war to
date. It was labeled "a reconnaissance in force,"29
and the operation was to consist of 1,700 men
from the 54th, 72nd, 73rd, and 75th Battalions.
Their objective was the highest point on Vimy
Ridge, Hill 145 (where the Vimy Memorial now
stands), a fortified series of interlocking machinegun nests, wire belts and deep dugouts. The
danger and complexities of attacking up-hill
where the Germans would have the advantages
of their fixed defences as well as the heights, when
combined with the difficulty of accurately laying
down counter-battery fire on the enemy guns,
resulted in the plan being conceived as a surprise
attack. Because of the strong defensive position,
it was necessary that poison gas smother the
enemy before he realised what was occurring.
The conception was flawed from the start and
the division's staff officers planning the raid had
little understanding of how chemical agents
worked in battlefield realities. Ever since the
British disaster at Loos in 1915, canisterreleased gas clouds were seen as a fickle weapon,
to be used only by specialists who were seen more
as chemists than soldiers. There was simply very
little understanding of this weapon by senior
commanders, who hoped that any release of gas
would emulate the first gassing at 2nd Ypres
when two whole divisions were routed. Although
gas was still a fearful weapon, better anti-gas
discipline and respirators ensured that no such
rout would occur again. 30 Equally detrimental,
the staff officers and commanders had neglected
training their soldiers in any doctrine - or set of
common accepted instructions or guidelines about how to work with this weapon. Yet, because
of the formidable position of the Germans on
Vimy, gas was needed for the very reason that
other more conventional weapons could not
guarantee success. Gas was not the weapon of
choice, but of desperation. Ill-placed faith created
d e l u s i o n s w h i c h o u t w e i g h e d all logical
assumptions.
Moreover, the heights of Vimy were illsuited for a gas cloud release. Being heavier

t h a n air, poison gas sinks into low-lying
trenches, dugouts and shellholes. Gas was an
useful weapon for ferreting the enemy out into
the open, but it had to reach his lines first. For
gas to move uphill would require a very strong
breeze and without it the gas would pollute the
craters and depressions that pocketed the Vimy
battlefield - the exact positions t h a t the
attackers would have to pass over to reach their
destination. Without a forceful breeze the
operation would be fiasco.
The 85th Battalion took part in carrying
hundreds of gas canisters into the trenches in
preparation for the gas attack; its regimental
history notes that "fifteen tons of gas was to be
sent over to strike terror into the black heart of
the enemy. The first wave was to be of deadly
poisonous gas that would kill every living thing
in its path: while the second would corrode all
metal substances and destroy guns of every
description. When complete all our men would
have to do would be to walk into the enemy
trenches, throw out their dead bodies and take
possession." 31 Such assumptions must have
sounded fanciful to some of the veterans, but as
this was the official line, and it accorded with
the constant rumours that percolated at the front
with r e g a r d s to new, lethal gases being
introduced, it is little wonder that the "poor
bloody infantry" placed so much faith in their
gas clearing the enemy trenches. 32
Once again the task of bringing the gas
cylinders into the line fell to the infantry and as
one Canadian remarked, it was "a stupendous
job." I saw "grown, strong men cry, j u s t
exhausted."33 Private Owen Bingham of the 78th
Battalion added that those frightful canisters
required such an exertion that only about half
the men in his battalion were able to carry them.34
Despite the difficulty of the task, the "lunch
baskets", as they were code-named this time, had
been brought and set-up in the front line by the
night of 25-26 February. It was left to the men of
Special Gas Company "M" to give the signal when
the wind was of the right speed and direction.
Some had a better tactical appreciation of
the situation and at least two of the four Battalion
c o m m a n d e r s a r g u e d t h a t the raid was
i m p r a c t i c a l . L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l A.H.G.
Kemball, the commander of the 54th Battalion,
objected to Brigadier-General Victor Odium,

14
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Examples of gas masks. Above, a soldier adjusts his
comrade's gas mask; Right: an early style gas helmet.
commander of the 11th Brigade, that because
of the unpredictable wind, the raid should be
postponed and more artillery fire brought to bear
on the German lines. Equally concerned,
Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Beckett, the commander
of the 75th Battalion, believed that not only was
the surprise attack no longer a secret, but that
his troops had no training with gas. Aware that
two of his experienced and decorated battalion
commanders were unhappy with the plan,
Odium, long a veteran and accomplished planner
of raids himself, questioned his orders by writing
to and then strenuously arguing with General
Staff Officer 1 (the highest staff position in the
division) Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Ironside.
His central concern was that if the gas failed how
were his men to get across no-man's-land before
the enemy barrage opened up? 35 Ironside, a
future Chief of the Imperial General Staff, refused
to entertain ideas about postponement - too
much planning and hope were riding on the
raid. Their objections overruled, the attack
groups were moved to the front to prepare for
the assault. Despite the fact that commanders
never accompanied raiders, both Kemball and
Beckett refused to send their men into the
questionable battle without leading them from

the front. In the end, two experienced battalion
commanders, who had scouted the area and
seen the formidable defences their men were
up against, were ignored by staff officers willing
to rely on a s u p e r - w e a p o n to overcome
defenders who had spent two years fortifying
their position.
As the men of the 4th Division lay in the
cold mud, nerves taut, waiting in anticipation
for the opening barrage to begin, the soldiers
of the four attacking battalions cursed the
weather, the Germans and probably the Gas
Specialists as the wind remained too light or
blowing in the wrong direction for a canister
gas release. The frustration began to mount
as the intricate raid was postponed again and
again. Staff officers began to wonder if the
surprise of both the raid and the use of gas
had been lost; officers and men at the front
knew for s u r e as the G e r m a n defenders
shouted taunts to the Canadians to come over
the top. 36
In addition to the psychological pressure
of repeated postponements, the waiting also
15
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took its toll physically; for example, the 12th
Brigade lost three killed and 22 wounded from
s t r a y s h e l l i n g on 26 F e b r u a r y alone. 3 7
Moreover, during the delay, at least one
German artillery barrage "searching" the
C a n a d i a n front p u n c t u r e d some of t h e
canisters. A sentry noticed the gas and awoke
his platoon, but fearing to alert the Germans
he did not raise a gas alarm. Word was quietly
passed along the trenches, but it failed to reach
a small group of infantrymen in the path of
the wayward cloud - all were poisoned and one
man suffocated to death. 38 The Canadians were
learning the hard way that employing infantry
and gas together in an attack was a dangerous
p r o p o s i t i o n . Still, t h e p l a n r e m a i n e d
unchanged and the raiders were to follow
behind the second of two gas clouds into the
German trenches. It was the second gas cloud
which was to seal the German's fate, as it was
planned to catch many of them unprepared,
exhausted and lethargic from their ordeal with
the first cloud less than two hours earlier.
At last the wait ended when the British gas
specialists indicated there was proper wind
strength on the last night of February 1917.39 At
3 a.m. on 1 March, the Special Companies' Gas
Sergeants, wearing red, white and green
brassards to indicate to the Canadian infantry
who they were, released 1,038 cylinders of White
Star (chlorine and phosgene) gas into a stiff
breeze of 9 miles per hour, which carried it
quickly over to the German lines.40 Unfortunately
for the Canadians, the German defenders had
only recently been issued new orders to combat
gas cloud releases: "As soon as the alarm is given
shoot up red and green flares. Our artillery will
fire into the gas cloud and on the hostile
trenches."41 True to orders, the German counterb a r r a g e fell on the C a n a d i a n lines and
immediately punctured several canisters holding
phosgene for the second wave release, gassing
groups of Canadians and gas specialists. It did
nothing to raise the infantry's impression of their
special weapon.42
Messages sent back to the 4th Division
Headquarters by forward observers noted that
the Germans, adopting the new gas defence,
immediately fired red SOS flares and kept their
rifle fire "fairly regular" until the gas had moved
past their lines.43 The use of gas had brought the

Germans out of their dugouts, and because the
artillery fire from Canadian guns was "not
sufficiently concentrated and c a u s e d no
slackening of enemy fire," that is where they
remained - in position and manning their
fortified trenches. 44
The raiders were to go into no-man's-land at
0540, forty minutes after a second discharge of
gas. But minutes before the second gas cloud was
to be released, the wind changed and it could
not be liberated. In the 12th Brigade sector,
however, the message was not received and, when
the gas was released, it slowly moved up the ridge
only to stop and begin to float back towards the
Canadian lines, eventually drifting through the
waiting soldiers of the 11th Brigade on the left.45
A private from the 102nd Battalion, Maurice
Bracewell, remembered the terror as the gas
turned and seeped back into the Canadian lines:
"Our front lines got all the gas, the front trenches
were saturated with it."46 Although the gas
casualties suffered by Canadians were not
recorded in the confusion, they were probably
not heavy considering most men were equipped
with the very effective Small Box Respirator.
Because the gas was so dense in some areas, the
raiding parties, most from the 73rd Battalion,
were forced to leave their trenches, suffering
additional casualties from shell and bullet, as
they proceeded overland until they found their
assembly points. 47
Mistakenly thinking that the second gas
attack had blown through the German ranks, one
officer of the 50th Battalion, whose unit was
acting as a reserve on the flank of the 75th
Battalion, believed the orders passed down from
higher commands that our comrades "were just
going to jump over the top and pick up all these
gassed Germans." When he looked across the two
hundred and fifty yards of no-man's-land, just
minutes before the first wave of 75th Battalion
men were to go over, he was shocked to see the
Germans tightly packed in their trenches,
bayoneted rifles aimed at the Canadian lines. 48
The Canadian raiders, already committed to
battle and spurred on by their earlier raiding
success, persevered in the hope t h a t the
Germans had been sufficiently overcome by the
first wave of gas. They were not.
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A

t zero hour the Canadians went "over the
bags" and were met by withering fire. The
two Battalion Commanders were killed while
leading their men in the charge: Kemball of the
54th Battalion was riddled with bullets as he
searched for an opening through the German
wire, his body caught on the spooled rolls like
some macabre scarecrow; Sam Beckett, at the
head of his troops as they scrambled across
the fire zone, was shot through the heart by a
sniper. Because it was expected that the gas

for help, only to watch a bullet shatter his skull
and splatter brain and blood over him. 51 Still
the Canadians rushed on, advancing through
c r a t e r s and over fallen c o m r a d e s . J a c k
Quinnell, like the rest of the Canadians caught
within the withering barrage of metal, skirted
shellhole after shellhole as he attempted to
draw closer to the German line. Popping into a
crater already occupied by one of his officers,
the man turned to him and shouted, "I'm going
to make a run for it; you can do what you like."

Canadians soldiers advancing across no-man's-land.

would silence the enemy, white flags had been
set up to mark the gaps in the wire. These now
drew the Canadians into natural killing zones
as German machine-gunners aimed at these
hard-to-miss targets. 49 Scores of Canadians
were mowed down as they struggled through
the wire of no-man's-land. In less than five
bloody minutes, the 54th Battalion alone lost
its Commanding Officer, two of the four
Company Commanders killed (the other two
injured) and close to 190 men, remembered
Sergeant Major Alex Jack .50
The futile a s s a u l t degenerated into a
c h a r n e l h o u s e , b u t t h r o u g h o u t i t the
C a n a d i a n s displayed their reputation for
dogged tenacity which they had won on earlier
battlefields. It was a grim time nonetheless as
friends and companions who had survived the
horrors of the Somme were cut down in swaths.
C a u g h t on some wire in n o - m a n ' s - l a n d ,
Signaller Stanley Baker turned to his partner

He rose and stumbled off, promptly taken down
by a bullet. The wild dash across no-man'sland was the last for many Canadians that day
as enemy fire, poison gas and even Canadian
shells falling short, left bodies strewn over noman's-land.
The C a n a d i a n gas cloud v a p o u r s to
shellholes in no-man's-land and was
strengthened when the Germans fired gas
shells into the Canadian assembly trenches
forcing the raiders to don their respirators,
which reduced visibility and made it more
difficult to breath as they desperately sought
gaps in the wire.52 In spite of all obstacles, a
group of Canadians cleared a 500-yard section
of the German trench in hand-to-hand fighting.
The general breakdown of the assault meant
the surviving C a n a d i a n s from all four
battalions were forced into a running battle in
the German trenches. Cut off from their own
lines by counterattacks, the Canadian infantry
17
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were virtually surrounded until a successful
break-out by several officers allowed dozens of
men to escape. But, as one trench warrior
observed, "we had very heavy casualties,
especially among the officers."53
Those soldiers wounded in no-man's-land
crawled to shellholes for safety and in the process
often fell victim to their own gas which had
pooled in the mucky depressions. Stuck in a
crater while the Germans sniped anything that
moved, Stanley Baker remembered watching
the men in his large hole slowly being killed as
exposed heads and backs were blasted by
sharpshooters. Employing one of the Canadian
corpses for cover he used his helmet to dig a
shallow trench to reach another hole in the
rear. The lingering gases made him cry and
vomit, but he finally wormed his way back to
the Canadian line later that night. 54 In the
chaos of the battle, with smoke and fire
obscuring vision, gas masks clouding up and
reducing the intake of breath, many of the
soldiers removed their respirators for periods
of time. Many were overcome by gas. Those who
did not quickly escape their shellholes never
left.
Those who were not suffocated by their own
gas cried out piteously all night, their voices rising
and falling in shrieks and moans, but always
carrying over the battlefield. One final tragedy
occurred when several wounded men were
trapped in a series of shellholes near the
Canadian lines by German snipers. An officer
called down an artillery barrage on the German
positions to give some cover to get the wounded
in, but once again the fire was short and many of
those men were annihilated by their own shells
before the guns were frantically called off.55
Although danger remained from snipers and
stray shells, several Canadians who could not
stand leaving their companions behind slipped
over their own parapet to locate victims and drag
them into the lines. Dozens of men were later
found in gas-infected shellholes covered in
yellowish bile as they u n c o n t r o l l a b l y
discharged pints of liquid from their lungs. The
gurgling of companions' last breaths through
corrupted airways was a memory that haunted
many survivors for the rest of their lives.
The ghastly carpet of Canadians that
covered m u c h of t h e battlefield was so
disturbing that, on the morning of the 2nd, a
18
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German officer rose above his parapet with a
white flag and walked into no-man's-land
where he offered the Canadians a respite to
collect their wounded and dead. Several
Germans also helped to gather a number of
the slain which were deposited n e a r the
Canadian lines. One of the 43 corpses was
Colonel Kemball, who was peeled off the
German wire and returned with honours. At a
prearranged time the hostilities continued at
0815 hours on 3 March. 56

W

hen the roll was called the next day, the full
extent of the disaster became known; the
four attacking battalions suffered 687 casualties
- a 43 percent casualty rate. 67 Those men who
were not too numb with exhaustion began to
question the whole raid. The War Diary of the
54th critically remarked that the "first discharge
of gas apparently had no effect on the enemy,"
but more importantly, the question arises as to
why they would have thought any differently.58
Both the Canadians and Germans were equipped
with very good gas masks by this point in the
war, which made the use of canistered gas almost
useless unless employed against poorly trained
or surprised opponents. 59 The distance of 200
to 250 yards between the lines meant that the
enemy had between one and two minutes before
the gas reached them. That was certainly enough
time to don respirators, especially if they were
aware of the possible use of gas. The series of
delays, when combined with German intelligence
gathered from raids and simple observation, had
already eliminated the surprise factor. It is clear,
however, that both Ironside and Watson were
unwilling to call off the long-awaited raid. Gas
was a weapon which was supposed to have made
the raid a walk-over, and instead its use led to
one of the worst disasters of the war for the
Canadian Corps. As Stanley Baker of the 54th
Battalion bitterly remembered, he knew little of
gas before the battle, but by the end he "knew
what it tasted like."60
If gas was despised by the front-line troops,
it was now also universally condemned by the
commanders in the rear. In an after -battle report,
Brigadier-General J.H. McBrien, commander of
the 12th Brigade, noted t h a t the initial
"discharge brought the enemy up out of his
dugouts and made him suspect and prepare
to resist an attack or raid."61 His equal, the
12
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Brigadier-General Victor Odium (holding rifle),
commander of 11th Infantry Brigade.
commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, Victor
Odium, was more emphatic and raged that the
infantry should never have been sent over, for
it was obvious with the rifle fire coming from
the German lines that the defenders had not
b e e n i n c a p a c i t a t e d by the gas. 6 2 Their
commander, Major-General David Watson,
echoed his brigadiers, and later wrote that "gas
was overestimated, and too much reliance was
therefore placed on it."63 The Canadians had
honed their raiding skills during the last two
years, but they had no idea how to integrate
poison gas into that type of warfare, the exact
operation that should have been investigated
and studied by Ironside and Watson. Such
reflections were correct concerning the limited
usefulness of gas clouds as tactical weapons,
b u t t h a t did little for t h e h u n d r e d s of
Canadians rotting on the battlefield.
Gas remained a very useful weapon when
employed properly, but the infantry hoped to
never see the vile stuff again. As the war
progressed, so too did the use of poison gas, until
by 1918 it daily plagued the soldiers on the
battlefields of the Western Front.64 Learning from
the debacle, the Canadians decided, and rightly
so, against combining gas released from cylinders
and infantry attacks for the rest of the war.
Starting at the Battle for Vimy Ridge in April
1917, gas shells were increasingly used in
barrages and counter-battery work to accomplish
a variety of tactical missions and eventually
became an integral component of the fireplans
for 1918.

M

eanwhile, for Sergeant-Major Alex Jack the
raid remained, "a nightmare, [an] absolute
nightmare of a raid.. .which very much weakened
[the division] when Vimy came along."65 In that
historic battle five weeks later, the soldiers of the
4th were once again tasked to capture the same
position. The 4th was the only division not to
take all of its objectives on 9 April. Having its
best men and most experienced officers
machine-gunned and suffocated to death in the
aborted raid h a d destroyed the fighting
efficiency of the division, which required many
months of restaffing and intensive training to

regain its form. In addition to four battalions
being physically decimated, the morale of the
division was nearly shattered. 66 Faith in all
commanders was only barely redeemed by the
bravery exhibited by front-line officers during
the heat of battle. Whatever General Watson
t h o u g h t the implications of his division
suffering a crippling reversal to be, his personal
diary contained no clues and very few entries.
His only explanation for the failure of the raid
was that "the front trenches [were] too far
apart. " He had no comments on faulty staff
work. Infantry survivors like Maurice Bracewell
realised t h a t s o m e t h i n g far graver h a d
occurred. 67
The 4th Division's gas raid was the single
most self-destructive Canadian raid of the war.
It not only temporarily impaired the fighting
efficiency of the 4th Division, but called into
question the whole policy of raiding. The most
experienced Canadian divisional commander,
Arthur Currie, who was soon to be appointed
corps commander, had forbidden uncontrolled
raiding in the months prior to the Battle of Vimy
Ridge. After a study of the after-battle reports,
he noted that the results generally did not bear
out the casualties to the attackers. More
detrimental, it was the best men of the units the junior officers, NCOs and other ranks - who
were generally lost. When necessary, Currie
ordered raids to be carried out, but he certainly
did not endorse such raids for the simple sake
19
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Canadian stretcher-bearers, wearing gas masks, bring in Canadian wounded.

of keeping men busy. 68 Watson's failure to
understand this must surely place him, as
some of his junior officers noted, in the second
echelon of Canadian commanders. Although
few have tried to analyse Watson or most of
the other Canadian divisional commanders, it
seems that he did not share Currie's strong
will or desire for intricate planning. Perhaps it
was a case, as one junior officer remarked, that
"his personality was rather put in the shade
by that of his General Staff Officer Grade I Lieutenant-Colonel E. Ironside. The general
opinion was t h a t Ironside was the real
c o m m a n d e r of the division." 6 9 Although
overshadowed by the towering Ironside, with
more experience Watson learned from his
mistakes - perhaps by more closely following
Byng and later Currie's direction. Nonetheless,
neither Watson nor Ironside, despite being
experienced in trench fighting, exhibited good
judgement in their planning - a fault that can
be directly a t t r i b u t e d to t h e i r lack of
understanding and failure to devise a doctrine
for poison gas. Despite an initial foray into the
topic, more work needs to be done on Watson
and all the divisional commanders in order to
ascertain their influence on each of the four
divisions and the Canadian Corps in general. 70

S u c h an analysis might go some way to
explaining the extent to which Canadian success
was based on technology, doctrinal and tactical
innovations, the good morale of the soldiers,
on the structure and size of formations, or the
influence of individual commanders.
The spiralling policy of raiding had begun to
get out of hand in the months prior to the assault
on Vimy Ridge. The harsh rebuke of the Gas Raid
of 1 March 1917, happened time and time again
to those who had begun to expect results rather
than carefully plan for them. As a result, the
Canadians learned from their mistakes and
returned to the basics of war-fighting. Byng's
policy was to train every soldier to know all
aspects of the battlefield and his expected
role. The Gas Raid was a powerful lesson which
drove officers and soldiers to hone their hardwon skills in order to never repeat such a
disaster. 71 When the Canadians went "over the
top" at Vimy, they would not be blind cattle
mounting the slaughterhouse ramp like the men
of the 4th Division five weeks earlier; they were
to be thinking soldiers, whose commanders
relied on the ever-refined doctrine of soldiers
leaning into massive artillery barrages, rather
than a nebulous gas cloud.
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Not only did the raid waste the four
battalions, it illustrated exceedingly poor
leadership from Watson, Ironside and his staff
planners. The naivety of the 4th Division's staff
officers was s h o c k i n g a n d t h e i r flimsy
understanding of the battlefield realities of poison
gas needlessly threw away Canadian lives.
Perhaps the use of this exotic weapon stemmed
from a desire to distinguish the most junior
division from the rest, but the operational
disaster which resulted not only left the survivors
wary of gas, but also of the "red tabs" in the rear
who foisted it on them. Gas was clearly
overestimated, yet it was not a new weapon and
it had been used on the Western Front for almost
two years. The success of gas in several
sensational battles obscured its true status as a
useful support rather than "war-winning"
weapon, and allowed those in the rear to convince
themselves that they had found the solution to
tactical p r o b l e m s . Watson a n d Ironside
overlooked the very real and documented failures
of gas because they wished it to succeed. They
succumbed to that strange act of delusion that
occurs when the odds are stacked against you
and caution gets thrown to the wind. The rapidly
evolving technology of this modern war had
ushered in great change, but the interaction of
soldier and technology was a dangerous mix if
not fully explored first in experimentation,
doctrine and training.
Finally, and equally grievous, the failure to
heed the advice of experienced front-line officers
showed a dangerous rigidity within the division.
The success of the 4th Division in later battles,
after it had recuperated from the lashing of the
March Raid, proved that it had learned the
requirements for success: meticulous planning,
accurate battlefield intelligence, and the necessity
of a combined-arms doctrine based on artillery
and infantry working in close conjunction. Still,
for the "poor bloody infantry" in the trenches,
the rift between staff and front-line officers was
deepened. There were few survivors in the 4th
Division who would not have agreed with
Lieutenant Howard Green of the 54th Battalion
that the raid "was just a proper slaughter." 72

the occupation of Mons on 11 November 1918,
clearly marked the Canadian Corps as one of the
finest fighting formations on the Western Front.
With the Australian Corps, it was perceived as
the spearhead of the British Expeditionary Force.
But before it earned that designation, the Corps
learned the hard way, the Western Front way, that
success was often bought with the blood of
previous failures.
The Germans and their commanders might
have been caught at Vimy Ridge in April 1917
with a smug attitude. After all, they had easily
repulsed units of the 4th Division less than a
month before, and here again were those same
British colonials trying to overcome another,
larger, nearly impregnable fortress. Perhaps the
Canadian reputation, forged in the big battles and
t r e n c h r a i d s of 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 1 6 , h a d b e e n
exaggerated? As Vimy showed, perhaps not.
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